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T                
he foreclosure crisis that began in earnest in 2006 continues to 
shrink the once valuable assets of homeowners, communities, 
and investors. From the fourth quarter of 2005 to the fourth 
quarter of 2008, both the U.S. foreclosure rate and the seriously delin-
quent rate (the share of outstanding mortgages 90 or more days past 
due) more than tripled—and the severity of the problem is far from 
over. More than 3 million households have lost their homes in the last 
three years, and as many as 5 million more could lose their homes in the 
next three years (Simon).
A striking feature of the foreclosure crisis is the variation in its se-
verity across both time and space. Initially, the foreclosure crisis hit 
low-income  neighborhoods  disproportionately.1  Foreclosures  remain 
concentrated in these neighborhoods. But in recent months, the fore-
closure epidemic has spread more deeply into higher-income neigh-
borhoods. These higher-income neighborhoods have not been hit uni-
formly, however. Thus, foreclosure rates now vary widely across both 
lower- and higher-income neighborhoods. 
Kelly D. edmiston is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. This 
article is on the bank’s website at www.KansasCityFed.org.
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The variability in foreclosure rates raises important questions: What 
accounts for the evolving pattern of foreclosure rates across neighbor-
hoods, and where might concentrations of foreclosures occur in the 
future? The answers to these questions are critical for home buyers, 
sellers, and investors. They are also key pieces of information for poli-
cymakers in stemming the tide of foreclosures. And, lenders need these 
answers to effectively evaluate risk.
This article analyzes the seven states of the Tenth Federal Reserve 
District to help shed light on the foreclosure rate pattern and to explore 
where foreclosure trends are likely to head. The analysis confirms that 
foreclosure rates have been high in low-income neighborhoods—but 
only to the extent that subprime mortgages penetrated those neighbor-
hoods. It finds further that the foreclosure crisis is seeping into higher-
income neighborhoods—due primarily to unfavorable conditions in 
local economies and residential real estate markets.
The first section of the article describes recent foreclosure trends 
and points out how unevenly the crisis has cut across both time and 
space. The second section explores how incomes have influenced the 
variability of foreclosures in neighborhoods. The third examines the 
critical, perhaps dominant, role that housing market conditions play in 
the uneven effects of the crisis. The fourth section examines how local 
economic conditions, primarily unemployment and self-employment, 
can help explain why high foreclosure rates have spread to higher-in-
come neighborhoods, where most homeowners hold prime loans.
I.  RECENT TRENDS IN FORECLOSURE RATES
Mortgage foreclosure and delinquency rates have increased dra-
matically over the last few years. The crisis has hit a variety of mortgage 
holders and, as it evolves, its scope continues to broaden. In addition, 
the evidence shows that the crisis has spread unevenly across regions, 
states, and neighborhoods.  
From 2006 to 2008, the housing market was marked by mass 
defaults of subprime loans. Subprime loans were generally made to 
borrowers with insufficient credit to qualify for a conventional prime 
mortgage. Typically, such borrowers have credit scores below 620.2 
As the crisis began, 3.3 percent of subprime loans were in foreclosure 
(Mortgage Bankers Association). By the end of 2008, 13.7 percent of Economic REviEw • SEcond quaRtER 2009  53
subprime loans were in foreclosure, and 23.9 percent were past due. 
The crisis will probably get worse before it gets better, as millions of 
subprime mortgages remain outstanding.
Many subprime loans had a fixed rate for an initial two or three 
years, at which point the loan “reset” to an adjustable-rate mortgage 
(ARM). The new variable interest rate was generally higher than the 
original fixed rate. Anecdotal evidence abounds of subprime mortgag-
ors unable to make the payments on their mortgages upon reset (Chris-
tie 2007a), but many subprime borrowers have defaulted before the 
reset date (Christie 2008). 
Another type of reset mortgage, payment option ARMs, is likely to 
have even more substantial resets than subprime mortgages. These ad-
justable-rate mortgages give the borrower the option to pay a minimum 
monthly amount for the first few years of the mortgage. Typically, this 
minimum payment is substantially below the amount required to cover 
the interest accrued on the loan. Thus, the principal amount can grow 
significantly in a short time. 
Payment option ARMs typically reset to a fully amortizing rate 
after five years. Unlike subprime loan originations (and therefore re-
sets), which have diminished over time with the near eradication of the 
market, payment option ARMs are just beginning to reset. They will 
continue to reach considerably higher rates through 2012 (Chart 1). 
nontraditional mortgages are not alone in fueling the crisis. Fore-
closures on prime mortgages, especially adjustable-rate mortgages, have 
increased considerably in recent quarters (Chart 2). Foreclosures on 
fixed-rate mortgages, both prime and subprime, have also increased. 
Two main factors account for these foreclosures—relentlessly declining 
property values and the increasingly severe economic recession. 
To the extent that economic conditions and property values con-
tinue to deteriorate, foreclosure rates are expected to climb even higher. 
In particular, as the ranks of the unemployed continue to swell, savings 
accounts will likely be unable to keep pace with mortgage payments.
Just as the scope of the foreclosure crisis has varied over time, fore-
closure rates have also varied significantly over space. In other words, 
the performance of mortgage loans has varied across regions of the 
country, across states, and even across neighborhoods. 54  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
Chart 1
LOAn RESETS, 2008 – 2017
chart 2
nATIOnAL FORECLOSURE RATES By MORTGAGE TyPE
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There is considerable evidence of variation in mortgage loan per-
formance across geographic regions. In the fourth quarter of 2008, 
foreclosure rates varied from as low as 0.7 percent in Wyoming to as 
high as 9.0 percent in Florida (Mortgage Bankers Association). In the 
Tenth Federal Reserve District, foreclosure rates ranged from 0.7 per-
cent in Wyoming to 2.2 percent in Colorado.3 Although foreclosures 
are increasing significantly in the Tenth District, the rise is much less 
dramatic than in other parts of the country, particularly in the Sunbelt 
and on the coasts. 
Counties showed even more variation in foreclosure rates than did 
states. In Tenth District counties, the foreclosure rate ranged from 0.03 
percent in Albany County, Wyoming, to 6.67 percent in Thomas County, 
nebraska (Map 1) (Lender Processing Services, Inc.). Significant varia-
tion also occurred within these counties—that is, across neighborhoods, 
where foreclosure rates ranged from zero percent to 17 percent.4 
Why have mortgages performed so unevenly across space? The next 
three sections of this article examine some of the factors that may be 
responsible for these spatial differences.
Map 1
FORECLOSURE  RATES  By  COUnTy,  TEnTH  FEDERAL 
RESERVE DISTRICT 
December 2008
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II.  INCOME
The link between income and mortgage default and foreclosure has 
been well-documented at the individual level. The same holds true at 
the neighborhood level. In the Tenth District, neighborhood foreclo-
sure rates increase consistently with the share of the population that is 
low-income.5
Specifically, in Tenth District neighborhoods where less than 5 per-
cent of the population is low-income, the average foreclosure rate is 3.0 
percent.6  In neighborhoods where more than 50 percent of the popula-
tion is low-income, the average foreclosure rate rises to 13.0 percent. 
The Tenth District analysis offers an explanation for the pattern of 
foreclosure rates with respect to income over the last few years.( Table 1)7 
Although high foreclosure rates are associated with low-income neighbor-
hoods, the analysis reveals that low-income populations lead to greater 
foreclosure rates only to the extent that subprime lending has penetrated the 
neighborhood.8  In particular, for neighborhoods with a subprime share of 
mortgage originations of less than 38 percent, higher low-income popu-
lations lead to lower foreclosure rates. Roughly 72 percent of Tenth Dis-
trict neighborhoods fall into this category. 
By definition, poor credit histories are associated with mortgage 
default. Evidence from Fannie Mae, however, suggests that up to 50 
percent of subprime borrowers could have qualified for prime loans 
(Christie 2007b), which indicates that the relationship between sub-
prime loans and foreclosure goes beyond simply reflecting poor credit 
histories. In fact, the Tenth District analysis shows that the relationship 
between foreclosure rates and subprime mortgage penetration persisted 
even after accounting for variations in average credit score across neigh-
borhoods. Further, subprime borrowers have been found to be less 
knowledgeable about the mortgage process, less likely to shop for the 
best terms, and less likely to be offered a choice in mortgage products, 
which puts them at greater risk for unfavorable outcomes (Courchane, 
Surette, and Zorn). 
The combination of the low-income share of the population and 
the subprime share of 2000-06 mortgage originations was the dominant 
factor in explaining variation in foreclosure rates across Tenth District 
neighborhoods. The result that a high density of low-income residents 
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may be surprising to some, but previous evidence suggests that, having 
accounted for the nature of the loans, mortgages in low- and moderate-
income areas actually perform better than mortgages nationally (Mills 
and Lubuele).  
Another possible explanation for this finding is that low-income 
people, who tend to have relatively low credit standing, were able to 
secure home financing only when subprime mortgages became avail-
able. In neighborhoods with little subprime lending, many low-income 
people were likely unable to secure home financing. About 53 percent 
of mortgages originated between 2000 and 2006 in the Tenth District 
were for refinancing. In turn, over 50 percent of refinanced subprime 
mortgages cashed out at least part of the equity in the home (Chom-
sisengphet  and  Pennington-Cross).9 To  the  extent  that  low-income 
people with relatively poor credit histories cashed out when they refi-
nanced, the lack of available credit in some neighborhoods may have 
mitigated increases in the foreclosure rate. 
III.  HOUSING MARKET CONDITIONS
Much recent research on the current foreclosure crisis suggests that 
the condition of housing markets plays a critical, perhaps dominant, 
role in explaining mortgage defaults. When homeowners fall behind on 
their mortgages in the face of declining property values, they often find 
they have insufficient equity in their homes to refinance or sell their 
homes at a price sufficient to cover the outstanding balance of their 
mortgages. Thus, upon default, the only option is foreclosure. This sec-
tion discusses the role that housing market conditions play in explain-
ing variation in foreclosure rates across neighborhoods—specifically, 
home price appreciation, vacancy rates, and owner-occupancy rates.
Home price appreciation
An especially critical factor in explaining foreclosure rates is ap-
preciation (or depreciation) in home values. This factor is especially 
relevant today, when property values have come under immense down-
ward pressure. According to regional Realtor associations in the Tenth 
District, metropolitan areas have seen the median price of homes sold 
decline as much as 8.5 percent year-over-year (Chart 3). The Realtor 
association numbers are in some sense artificially low, as 45 percent Economic REviEw • SEcond quaRtER 2009  59
of homes sold in the fourth quarter of 2008 were foreclosures, which 
are predominantly on the lower end of the price spectrum and heav-
ily discounted. nevertheless, other properties must compete with these 
foreclosure  properties  on  price,  which  should  depress  values  for  all 
properties. An alternative housing price index produced by the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) showed declines across virtually all 
Tenth District metro areas, but the declines were much less severe.10
A  1998  study  of  national  foreclosure  rates  from  1950  forward 
showed that home price appreciation and foreclosure rates for the U.S. 
as a whole move in opposite directions. But the authors of this study 
suggested that home price appreciation was only a minor factor and 
did not explain trends after the 1980s (Elmer and Seelig). More recent 
studies at a lower level of geography have found a more convincing 
connection. One analysis focused on the variation in subprime mort-
gage delinquency rates across metro areas, finding a strong relationship 
between the delinquency rate of subprime mortgages and house price 
chart 3
RECEnT HOUSE PRICES In TEnTH DISTRICT METRO-
POLITAn AREAS
(Percent Change, year-over-year)


























Metro Realtors (Mar 2009)
FHFA (Q4 2008)
Percent60  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
appreciation (Doms and others). Similarly, recent research found that 
house price appreciation in Massachusetts dominated other factors 
in explaining subprime mortgage foreclosures (Gerardi, Shapiro, and 
Willen). Much of the large increase in Massachusetts foreclosures in 
2006-07 was due to house prices that began falling in the summer of 
2005. Another state-level study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chi-
cago examined foreclosures for all types of loans, finding that higher 
rates of appreciation over a five-year period were associated with lower 
foreclosure rates (McGranahan). 
In the Tenth District analysis, as expected, neighborhood fore-
closure rates were negatively correlated with home price appreciation. 
That  is,  foreclosure  rates  were  lower  in  neighborhoods  where  area 
home price appreciation was stronger. Compared to a neighborhood 
in a metro area with little change in home values, a neighborhood in a 
metro area with a 5 percent decline in home values would be expected 
to suffer a 33 percent increase in the foreclosure rate (1.4 percentage 
points on average). In most areas, home price appreciation ranged be-
tween 1.5 percent and 6.3 percent. About 10 percent of the total varia-
tion in foreclosure rates across Tenth District neighborhoods can be 
explained by metro-wide home price appreciation. This relationship, 
however, was evident only in urban areas of the Tenth District.
In recent years, property values in some areas have fallen so much 
that some homeowners are choosing to walk away from mortgages even 
when they have the capacity to pay (Calculated Risk; The economist). 
Thus, an increasingly robust relationship between home price appre-
ciation and foreclosure rates would not be surprising. In the Tenth 
District, home price appreciation had a marginally stronger effect on 
foreclosures in 2007-08 than in 2006-07.
vacancy rates
neighborhood vacancy rates likely encourage neighborhood flight 
or depression of property values—both of which should lead to in-
creased  foreclosure  rates.11  Property  values  are  reduced  directly  by 
increasing the supply of available housing in the neighborhood. But 
more important, proximity to vacant properties and their associated 
problems makes a property less attractive to potential buyers. A study 
conducted in Philadelphia calculated that houses on blocks with aban-Economic REviEw • SEcond quaRtER 2009  61
doned properties sold for $6,715 less, on average, than houses on 
blocks with no abandoned properties (Research for Democracy). The 
loss increased with closer proximity to abandoned properties.
Existing research on the relationship between vacancy rates and 
foreclosure rates is sparse, however, and the results are mixed. The 
Tenth  District  analysis  explores  the  relationship  across  a  range  of 
neighborhoods in multiple cities, recognizing that other factors also 
explain neighborhood foreclosure rates.
In the analysis, vacancy rates were positively associated with fore-
closure  rates,  suggesting  that  homeowners  in  neighborhoods  with 
many vacant properties are more likely to default on their mortgages.12  
A doubling of a neighborhood’s vacancy rate, say from 4 to 8 percent, 
would be associated with a 6 percent increase in the foreclosure rate 
for the average Tenth District neighborhood  (0.25 percentage points 
on average). This relationship likely reflects instability in the neighbor-
hood, providing an impetus for residents to flee. Although changes in 
home values were included in the analysis, the relationship between 
vacancy rates and foreclosure rates at the neighborhood level could 
have further refined this effect. 
Vacancy rates were a much stronger factor in explaining foreclo-
sure rates in the Tenth District’s urban neighborhoods than in its rural 
neighborhoods. The average vacancy rate in the Tenth District during 
the period was 4.2 percent. 
owner-occupancy
During the real estate boom early in this decade, many property 
investors entered the market, often buying dozens of homes at a time, 
and sometimes virtually entire blocks. These properties typically were 
held for a short period of time and then resold (or “flipped”) at a higher 
price, generating an attractive profit. Many were rented to receive the 
highest payoff from a combination of renting and capital gain. Higher 
leverage generates higher returns, and thus many investment properties 
were mortgaged with as little money down as possible.13 Investors often 
acquired interest-only or payment option ARMs to minimize monthly 
payments while the property was being renovated, rented, or held for 
appreciation. In years past, such loans generally were made only to af-
fluent homeowners or well-heeled investors with strong credit records. 62  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
More recently, however, underwriting standards were weakened signifi-
cantly. 
As property values declined, investors often found themselves with 
properties that could not be sold for sums sufficient to pay off the 
mortgages, much less to make a profit. According to research by the 
Mortgage Bankers Association, investors are among the first to default 
if they see that home prices are falling and there is little chance of re-
couping their money (Brinkmann). Some investors have lost numerous 
properties to foreclosure at one time. 
The analysis of foreclosure rates in the Tenth District relies on owner-
occupancy rates as an inverse measure of investor-owned properties. The 
reasoning is that Census-based owner-occupancy statistics can account 
for properties owned by investors but fraudulently recorded as owner-oc-
cupied in mortgage applications, which would underestimate the share 
of properties in a neighborhood that are investor-owned. Underwriting 
standards tend to be more lax for mortgages on owner-occupied dwell-
ings, so investors could benefit substantially from falsely reporting that 
they would live in the properties being mortgaged. Such mortgage fraud 
has been rampant in this decade and continues to increase, even as the 
real estate market has significantly deteriorated (James, Butts, and Dona-
hue). Missouri and Colorado were the ninth- and tenth ranked states for 
mortgage fraud among 2004-08 originations. Many of the top states for 
mortgage fraud, including Rhode Island, Florida, Illinois, and Michigan, 
also have some of the highest foreclosure rates.
About 30 percent of all foreclosures nationally are investor-owned 
properties.14 In the Tenth District, mortgage applications in 2008 showed 
that roughly 27 percent of foreclosures were investor-owned properties. 
Across Tenth District states, the investor share of foreclosures ranged from 
14 percent in Wyoming to 49 percent in new Mexico. Of course, to the 
extent that mortgage fraud is prevalent, this number underestimates the 
degree of investor penetration in Tenth District neighborhoods. The av-
erage owner-occupancy rate in the district is 59 percent.15  
While investors clearly are susceptible to default and foreclosure in 
the face of declining property values, the role of investor-owned prop-
erties in explaining foreclosure rates is not altogether clear from a con-
ceptual perspective. On one hand, the prototypical investor likely has 
higher, more diversified net worth than most owner-occupants and is Economic REviEw • SEcond quaRtER 2009  63
therefore better positioned to suffer through losses. On the other hand, 
foreclosure often leaves owner-occupants without their valued homes, 
giving them more of an incentive to stay and find solutions to their 
mortgage problems.
The Tenth District analysis revealed that foreclosure rates in neigh-
borhoods tend to be higher when owner-occupancy rates are higher. 
In other words, larger shares of investor-owned property surprisingly 
lead to lower foreclosure rates. But the magnitude of the effect is small. 
Specifically, a five-percentage-point rise in an owner-occupancy rate 
is associated with a 0.1-percentage-point rise in the foreclosure rate, 
a negligible effect. This result suggests that the effect of the typically 
larger, more diversified portfolios of assets of investors roughly cancels 
out the often risky nature of investor mortgages.
IV.  LOCAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
The local economy is an important factor in rising foreclosure rates, 
both in higher-income neighborhoods and in neighborhoods overall. 
This section explores the roles of unemployment and self-employment 
in neighborhood foreclosure rates.
unemployment
Loss of a job or income is one of the most common triggers for 
mortgage default. A late 1980s study of a large mortgage lender found 
that 24 percent of seriously delinquent borrowers cited “general finan-
cial problems” as the cause of their delinquency, and 21 percent cited 
job loss specifically (Gardner and Mills). 
A cursory look at foreclosure numbers across the nation over the 
last few years reveals an important role for local economic conditions in 
determining local foreclosure rates. The Gulf states of Mississippi and 
Louisiana suffered very high delinquency and foreclosure rates in the 
aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Likewise, “rustbelt states” 
like Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana, which have suffered the brunt of 
the downward trend in manufacturing employment, have maintained 
some of the highest foreclosure rates over the last few years, at least 
until recently.16 A review of recent unemployment rates across Tenth 
District neighborhoods shows a clear relationship between economic 
conditions and foreclosure rates (Chart 4). 64  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
Existing research at the national level suggests a weak relationship 
“at best” between unemployment rates and foreclosure rates over time 
(Elmer and Seelig). But studies that focus on the state level and zip-
code level suggest there is such a relationship (McGranahan; Mian and 
Sufi). The Tenth District analysis confirms the relationship. Every one- 
percentage-point rise in the unemployment rate is associated with a 7 
percent increase, on average, in the neighborhood foreclosure rate (0.3 
percentage points on average).
Self-employment
An additional factor in the Tenth District analysis accounts for dif-
ferences in rates of self-employment. Self-employed people tend to have 
larger incomes than wage and salary workers (Fairlie). At the same time, 
their incomes generally are more volatile (Jensen and Shore). Given the 
volatility of income and the recent sharp downturn in economic activ-
Chart 4
UnEMPLOyMEnT AnD FORECLOSURE RATES,
TEnTH DISTRICT nEIGHBORHOODS
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ity, the self-employed would be more likely to face insufficient funds to 
make mortgage payments than wage and salary workers, for any given 
level of income. 
Further, the self-employed are more likely to be offered Alt-A and 
other nontraditional products, like option-ARMs, than wage and salary 
workers.17 These borrowers often do not qualify for prime loans because 
their incomes can be hard to document and can be volatile over time. 
Two recent surveys by the national Association for the Self-Em-
ployed showed the vulnerability of the self-employed. A March 2009 
survey showed that 40 percent of participants were concerned about 
the affordability of their home mortgages due to their type of mortgage. 
An October 2008 survey showed that 73 percent of survey participants 
were concerned about the recent downturn in the economy.
The Tenth District analysis revealed that foreclosure rates are higher 
in neighborhoods where a greater share of the work force is self-em-
ployed—and the magnitude of the effect was quite large. Across Tenth 
District neighborhoods, the average neighborhood had 74 self-employed 
workers per thousand residents. Rates ranged from 35 to 245 self-em-
ployed workers per thousand residents. Given two neighborhoods with 
similar incomes and other factors, ten additional self-employed workers 
per thousand residents were associated with a 7 percent increase in the 
average Tenth District neighborhood foreclosure rate (0.3 percentage 
points on average). 
V.  CONCLUSION
The analysis of neighborhoods in the Tenth Federal Reserve Dis-
trict discloses a number of factors that should draw the attention of 
buyers, lenders, community organizations, and policymakers. 
As expected, foreclosures in the Tenth District have been concen-
trated in lower-income neighborhoods. Low-income neighborhoods, 
however, were likely to see higher foreclosure rates only to the extent 
that subprime mortgages penetrated those neighborhoods. Otherwise, 
large low-income populations lead to lower foreclosure rates. Together, 
low-income shares of the population and subprime shares of mortgage 
originations accounted for about 30 percent of the total variation in 
foreclosures explained by the analysis.66  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
During the current recession, the foreclosure crisis has crept from 
low-income neighborhoods in the Tenth District into higher-income 
neighborhoods. Two factors help explain variations in foreclosure rates 
across these neighborhoods: residential real estate market conditions 
and local economic conditions. 
Real estate market conditions are perhaps the most important fac-
tor. Lower price appreciation was associated with higher foreclosure 
rates. The reasoning is that, in the face of declining property values, ho-
meowners having difficulty making mortgage payments may be unable 
to sell their homes for an amount sufficient to cover their mortgages. 
Further, if home equity becomes sufficiently negative, homeowners 
may choose to walk away from their mortgage obligations. Home value 
appreciation accounted for about 10 percent of the total variation in 
foreclosures explained by the analysis.
Somewhat unexpected was that higher owner-occupancy rates, or 
lower shares of investor-owned property, were associated with higher 
foreclosure rates. A likely factor contributing to this finding is that 
investors tend to have larger, more diversified financial assets, which 
makes them better positioned to weather losses. Higher vacancy rates, 
which diminish neighborhood quality, were also shown to lead to high-
er neighborhood foreclosure rates. 
Local economic conditions, specifically higher rates of unemploy-
ment and self-employment, were also associated with higher foreclosure 
rates. The magnitude of the unemployment rate effect was quite large: a 
three-percentage-point difference in the unemployment rate was associ-
ated with a 21 percent difference in the foreclosure rate (one percentage 
point on average). That higher rates of self-employment income were 
associated with higher foreclosure rates likely reflects the relative volatil-
ity of self-employment income, especially during economic recessions. 
Local economic conditions, though significant, had a much smaller 
impact on neighborhood foreclosure rates than did income, subprime 
mortgage penetration, and property appreciation.
Early in the crisis, foreclosures were heavily concentrated in low-
income neighborhoods. While low-income neighborhoods continue to 
suffer from high foreclosure rates, the problem is increasingly seeping 
into higher-income neighborhoods. This article suggests that buyers, 
lenders, community organizations, and policymakers should look to Economic REviEw • SEcond quaRtER 2009  67
neighborhood property conditions and economic conditions to uncover 
likely future hotspots. Such an analysis would help community orga-
nizations and policymakers to best target future preventative resources 
and buyers and lenders to appropriately gauge risk. 68  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
Variable Source Mean
(Std. Dev.)


















Low Credit Score (% of population) Federal Reserve Board of Governors 21.1% 
(8.91%)
Moderate Credit Score (% of population) Federal Reserve Board of Governors 19.6% 
(7.00%)




House Price Appreciation Office of Housing Enterprise Oversight 4.21% 
(3.15%)
Housing Permits (per 1,000 existing homes) U.S. Census Bureau 0.905 
(1.39)
Self-Employment Rate  
(per 1,000 population)
U.S. Census Bureau 74.3 
(20.4)
Population Density ESRI Arcview 2,158 
(2,570)
Median Income Federal Financial Institutions Examination 












Subprime Originations (Share of total, 2000 
– 2006)




Median year House Built U.S. Census Bureau 1967 
(15)




Property Tax (relative to house value) U.S. Census Bureau 1.51% 
(0.94%)
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EnDnOTES
1In this article, a neighborhood is defined as a Census tract. A Census tract is 
a small, relatively homogeneous statistical subdivision of a county that numbers 
between 2,500 and 8,000 in population. Census tracts are designed to reflect the 
division of counties into neighborhoods.
2There is no universal definition of a subprime mortgage, and thus researchers 
have used a variety of rubrics to decide which mortgages are subprime and which 
are not. Options include: (1) loans reported as high-cost in Home Mortgage Dis-
closure Act (HMDA) data; (2) home loans originated by lenders who specialize 
in subprime mortgages, according to a list supplied by the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD); and (3) home loans in securitized 
pools marketed as subprime. Each method of collecting data on subprime home 
loans has its advantages and disadvantages (Mayer and Pence). In this study, loans 
with interest rates of 3 percent or greater above a Treasury security of the same 
maturity (high-cost loans) were considered subprime. This method was utilized 
because a larger share of home loans (around 80 percent) is covered in the HMDA 
data than in the securitized pools marketed as subprime (Avery, Brevoort, and 
Canner).
3The U.S. foreclosure rate was 3.3 percent in the fourth quarter.
4Five neighborhoods in the Tenth District had foreclosure rates above 15 
percent, according to foreclosure broker RealtyTrac: three in Pueblo County, CO; 
one in Adams County, CO; and one in Jackson County, MO.
5Low-income residents are defined as those with income of less than 50 per-
cent of the area (state or metropolitan) median income.
6The foreclosure rate is the number of foreclosure starts over the period Janu-
ary 2007 — June 2008 relative to the number of mortgages outstanding. Data 
on foreclosures are estimates from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD). 
7A summary of the analysis is presented in Table 1. A description of data used 
in the analysis is provided in Appendix Table A1, and full results are provided in 
Appendix Table A2.
8Because few subprime loans have been originated since mid-2007, the num-
ber of subprime loans has dwindled over the last couple of years as loans have 
cured by default, prepayment, or refinance. In the last two years, the number of 
subprime loans outstanding has decreased by 11 percent. 
 9A cash-out refinance is defined here as one where the new mortgage is at 
least 5 percent higher than the principal on the existing mortgage.
10For more information on housing price indexes, see Rappaport.
11Vacancy rate is defined as the number of vacant homes in a neighborhood, 
expressed as a percentage of all homes in that neighborhood.Economic REviEw • SEcond quaRtER 2009  73
12Of course, just as vacancy rates may influence foreclosure rates, the reverse 
may also be true. While such a relationship is clearly sensible, efforts were taken 
to ensure that the time period in which vacancy rates were measured preceded 
the period in which foreclosure rates were measured. An extended analysis that 
accounts for this possibility in a more sophisticated way confirms the effect of 
vacancy rates on foreclosure rates.
13Despite late-night infomercials to the contrary, purchasing real estate as 
investment property with no money down is exceedingly rare.
14This figure is based on properties in the RealtyTrac database where the 
owner address is different than the property address.
15Data are from the American Housing Survey. Accessed February 10, 2009, 
at  http://www.2010census.biz/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs07/tab1a-1.pdf.  Roughly 
68 percent of all occupied homes are owned by their occupants.
16More recently, states such as Florida and nevada, which experienced espe-
cially rapid appreciation earlier in the decade and rampant building, have suffered 
the highest foreclosure rates.
17Alt-A mortgages are A- rated paper. Generally, the borrower is creditworthy 
for a prime loan but does not meet some other specified underwriting standard. 
About 75 percent of Alt-A mortgages were offered to borrowers who did not fully 
document their income. An option-ARM is an adjustable-rate mortgage where 
the borrower is allowed to make a minimum payment for a specified period of 
time. Generally, this payment is well below the fully amortizing payment, so 
principal builds over time. 74  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
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